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1 
During the last decade, economists have attempted to identify Sticky Floors in the labour market, 1 
thereby building on the seminal work by Booth et al. (2003). Sticky Floors can be described as 2 
the pattern that women are, compared to men, less likely to start to climb the job ladder. Thereby 3 
Sticky Floors complement the well-known concept of Glass Ceilings which implies that women 4 
are less like to reach the top of the job ladder.
1
 Evidence for the existence of Sticky Floors has 5 
been found in countries such as Italia (Filippin and Ichino, 2005), Spain (Gradín and del Río, 6 
2009), Thailand (Fang and Sakellariou, 2011) and the United States (Baker, 2003). In Belgium, 7 
the country where the present study is accomplished, Deschacht et al. (2011) conclude, based on 8 
their discrete time event history analysis of the Panel Study of Belgian Households data (1994-9 
2001), that women near the top face fewer obstacles to promotions than women in the lower- and 10 
mid-career levels. In addition, Belgium is one of the 12 European countries in which 11 
Christofides et al. (2013), investigating the gender wage gap across 24 EU member states, found 12 
evidence for Sticky Floors. 13 
From a policy perspective, it is important to determine the nature of the phenomenon of 14 
Sticky Floors in order to design adequate policy actions. Based on the mentioned literature, 15 
however, it is unclear whether Sticky Floors result from gender differences in human capital, 16 
preferences and behaviour at the employee side or from preferences (and unequal treatment) at 17 
the employer side. In our study, we contribute to the literature by investigating the importance of 18 
employer preferences (and thereby discrimination) in explaining Sticky Floors, keeping 19 
employee characteristics constant.
2
  20 
More concretely, we aim at answering the question whether unequal treatment of equally 21 
productive male and female job candidates by employers is heterogeneous by whether or not 22 
                                                     
1 See Albrecht et al. (2003), Arulampalam et al. (2007), Booth (2009), Kassenboehmer and Sinning (2014), Reuben et al. (2012), Smith et al. 
(2013) and Weinberger (2011) for some seminal and recent contributions to the literature on Glass Ceilings. In addition, see Blau and DeVaro 
(2007), Matteazzi et al. (2014) and Yap and Konrad (2009) for more general contributions on gender differentials in promotions. 
2 Throughout this article the terms “employer preferences” and “employer discrimination” are used to point to the general concept of unequal 
appraisal and treatment of women and men in the labour market in respect of employers. Therefore, these concepts do not refer to the narrower 
theoretical concept of Becker’s (1957) “employer discrimination”. 
2 
they apply for jobs implying a (first) promotion.
3
 Unfavourable treatment of females in the 1 
access to these positions can be expected based on the theoretical models of discrimination 2 
introduced by Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973).
4
 Discrimination against women applying for 3 
higher positions could result from the general distaste that employers, co-workers and customers 4 
may have to collaborate with women in these higher positions, potentially related to the 5 
traditional overrepresentation of men in these positions. Furthermore, employers could expect a 6 
higher average productivity from males relative to females in leading positions. This may relate 7 
to the match between these positions and more “masculine” characteristics such as dominance, 8 
autonomy and assertiveness on the one hand
5
 and the fact that females are documented as 9 
having, on average, a less continuous and committed labour market participation related to the 10 
traditional division of labour within the household and maternity leave (Baumle, 2009; 11 
Blandford, 2003; Budig and England, 2001; Romeu Gordo, 2009). In addition to the theoretical 12 
support by the frameworks of Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973), potential gender discrimination 13 
by employers when taking hiring decisions implying a promotion for the job candidate squares 14 
with the notion in the popular literature that men are promoted based on potential, while women 15 
are promoted based on prior performance (Carter and Silva, 2011). 16 
To the best of our knowledge, all former studies on gender differences in promotion 17 
opportunities have used regression-based methods on observational data (typically household 18 
survey or labour force data). The most common approach consists of Oaxaca-Blinder style 19 
decompositions of wage differentials in a part explained by observables related to human capital 20 
                                                     
3 This implies that we do not investigate unequal treatment in promotions within the firm. We come back to this issue later. 
4 These theories are based on neoclassical assumptions and have been criticised concerning different aspects – see, e.g., Bergmann (1989) in the 
context of gender based discrimination in the labour market. In spite of the development of alternative approaches to theorising discrimination 
such as the models of opportunistic discrimination, implicit discrimination, noncompeting groups and lexicographic search by employers (Altonji 
and Blank, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Darity and Mason, 1998), however, many recent contributions to the discrimination literature 
are still guided by the theoretical framework of the models of taste-based and statistical discrimination (Borjas, 2009; Charles and Guryan, 2008). 
Moreover, while some newer models are particularly applicable to the case of ethnic discrimination, the models of Becker (1957) and Arrow 
(1973) can be applied to the case of gender discrimination in a natural way. 
5 For instance, Oakley (2000) argues that the less assertive forms of communication by women might be inappropriate for functioning in the 
upper echelons of many corporations. 
3 
and occupational characteristics and an unexplained part pointing in the direction of 1 
discrimination (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder 1973). Residual gaps at the top of the wage distribution 2 
are interpreted then as complementary with the Glass Ceiling concept while residual gaps at the 3 
bottom of the wage distribution point in the direction of Sticky Floors. In their survey of 4 
experimental advances in the study of gender differentials in the labour market, Azmat and 5 
Petrongolo (2014) formulate two important drawbacks of using observational data to measure 6 
gender discrimination. First, most observational data do not capture some of the determinants of 7 
a workers productivity (e.g. motivation and intrinsic ability) which may be observed – and 8 
valued – by employers. Stated otherwise, based on these non-experimental data, researchers 9 
cannot control all variables employers take into account when making their hiring and 10 
remuneration decisions. As a result, no conclusive evidence of discrimination can be provided 11 
based on these data. Second, if pre-market investments in human capital or decisions to apply for 12 
a job implying a promotion are affected by the expectation of future labour market 13 
discrimination, the impact of discrimination is partly captured by observable human capital and 14 
occupational characteristics. 15 
To overcome the stated methodological problems, this study is novel in its approach to gather 16 
original experimental data on gender differences in promotion opportunities and thereby lets – as 17 
argued by Duflo (2006) – “the research question determine the data to be obtained instead of the 18 
data determining the questions that can be asked.” More concretely, we send out 576 pairs of 19 
fictitious job applications of individuals with about 5 years of job experience in their first and 20 
current job to vacancies for jobs requiring at least some and at most 5 years of experience. The 21 
two applications within each pair are similar, except for the revealed gender of the candidate, as 22 
will be explained below. By monitoring the reaction from the employer side, unequal treatment 23 
based on this single characteristic can be identified. This measure can be given a causal 24 
interpretation because all the information the employer receives is under control of the 25 
researcher so that selection on individual unobservables is eliminated. We send fictitious 26 
applications to vacancies implying a promotion in terms of occupational level and/or job 27 
authority compared with the current job of the candidate and to vacancies that are at the same 28 
functional and authority level as the current job. Thereby, we are able to test whether unequal 29 
4 
treatment of young men and women in the labour market is heterogeneous by whether or not 1 
jobs imply a promotion in comparison with employees’ current position.6 If employer 2 
preferences contribute to Sticky Floors, unequal treatment of male and female job candidates 3 
should be relatively more to the disadvantage of women who apply for a job implying a 4 
promotion. This is our research hypothesis. 5 
The Experiment 6 
Causal Evidence of Gender Discrimination by means of a Correspondence Experiment 7 
In order to answer our research question, we conducted a correspondence experiment. Within 8 
this experiment, pairs of fictitious job applications were sent to real vacancies. The applications 9 
within each pair were, as will be explained below, very comparable except for the gender of the 10 
applicant. By monitoring the subsequent call-back from the employer side, discrimination based 11 
on this single characteristic could be measured and given a causal interpretation. 12 
Correspondence experiments are widely viewed as providing the most clean and compelling 13 
evidence of unequal treatment in hiring (Riach and Rich, 2002). As argued in the introduction, 14 
any bias introduced by individual unobservable characteristics is eliminated because all the 15 
information received by the employer is controlled by the researcher. Strict equivalence between 16 
the fictitious job candidates is realised and unequal treatment in respect of employers is 17 
disentangled from other explanations of differential hiring outcomes such as differences in 18 
human capital and preferences at the employee side. 19 
                                                     
6 Stated otherwise, one can argue that a potential gender differential in call-back chances for a job implying a promotion at a new firm is 
comprised by a gender differential in hiring chances at a new firm and a gender differential in call-back for jobs implying a promotion. As we 
apply both for jobs implying a promotion and for jobs implying no promotion, our experimentally gathered data allows us to isolate the latter 
gender differential.  
5 
Concerning the identification of gender discrimination, the extensive correspondence 1 
experiment conducted by Neumark et al. (1996) is seminal. Neumark et al. (1996) showed that, 2 
in the Philadelphian labour market for waiters and waitresses of 1994, female job candidates 3 
had, compared to males, a substantially lower estimated probability of receiving an interview in 4 
high-price restaurants and a substantially higher probability of receiving one in low-price 5 
restaurants (where earnings were also lower). In the same realm, Albert et al. (2011), Booth and 6 
Leigh (2010), Carlsson (2011), Firth (1982), Petit (2007), Riach and Rich (1987), Riach and 7 
Rich (2006) and Weichselbaumer (2004) studied hiring discrimination based on gender in Spain, 8 
Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, France and Austria by means of a correspondence 9 
experiment. None of these studies, however, attempted to investigate heterogeneity in labour 10 
market discrimination by whether or not the jobs for which the fictitious applicants applied 11 
would imply a promotion. 12 
We conducted our experiment between October 2013 and March 2014 in the labour market 13 
of Flanders, the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. During this period we randomly 14 
selected 288 vacancies for jobs targeting Bachelors in business administration and 288 vacancies 15 
for jobs targeting Masters in business economics in the database of the Public Employment 16 
Agency of Flanders, the region’s major job search channel. We restricted ourselves to vacancies 17 
in the private sector requiring at most five years of work experience.
7
 Two job applications of 18 
individuals with five years of work experience (in a first and current job), identical in terms of 19 
productivity-relevant characteristics but different in their gender, were sent to the selected 20 
vacancies. We opted for individuals with five years of experience because Sticky Floors are 21 
related to the start of job ladder climbing. Moreover, jobs targeted at people with a tenure of five 22 
years could be expected to be heterogeneous in promotion aspects compared to their current 23 
(starters) job as “at least five years of work experience” is typically asked in (more) senior 24 
positions. 25 
                                                     
7 The database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders covers both the private and public sectors. However, we were forced to restrict 
ourselves to vacancies in the private sector. This was the case since, in Flanders, vacancies in the public sectors almost always ask potential job 
candidates to provide the recruiter with formal proofs of their educational degrees. As we did not want to falsify these degrees, we were not able 
to apply for public sector vacancies. 
6 
The data gathering process was reviewed and approved by the Ethical Committee of the 1 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of Ghent University at its meeting of 9 July 2 
2013. 3 
Construction of Fictitious Applications 4 
For each of the aforementioned academic degrees held by our fictitious applicants, we created 5 
two template applications comprising a resume and a motivation letter. We will refer to these 6 
(template) applications as the Type A and Type B applications. These types were equal in all 7 
productivity-relevant characteristics (such as educational qualifications, language skills and 8 
computer skills). However, to avoid detection of the experiment, they differed in lay-out and 9 
details. For instance, both candidates mentioned sports and cultural activities but the Type A 10 
applicant referred to general sports activities and (drama club) acting while the Type B applicant 11 
referred to fitness and tennis activities and playing saxophone. To ensure that our job 12 
applications were realistic and representative, example applications of the Public Employment 13 
Agency of Flanders were used and calibrated for our purposes. 14 
The Type A and Type B applicants were single individuals born, studying and living in 15 
comparable suburbs of Ghent, the second largest city of Flanders. These candidates graduated 16 
from tertiary education in June 2008 without any grade retention experience. In line with the 17 
vacancy to which the pair of applicants was sent, a specialisation was chosen.
8
 All of the 18 
applicants had graduated from University College Ghent (Bachelor in business administration) 19 
or Ghent University (Master in business economics). Since September 2008, the fictitious 20 
applicants were employed in a starters job in line with their academic degree and specialisation 21 
and with no job authority (see below for how we define the concept of job authority).
9
 22 
                                                     
8 For the Bachelor in business management, the specialisations used were: (i) accountancy and tax, (ii) finance and assurance, (iii) management 
of small- or medium-sized business, (iv) logistics, (v) marketing and (vi) legal practice. For the Master in business economics, the specialisations 
used were: (i) accountancy, (ii) finance and (iii) marketing. 
9 The professions of “accountant” (ISCO-08 code 3313), “file administrator assurances” (code 4312), “management assistant” (code 3343), “legal 
file administrator” (code 3411), “dispatcher” (code 3331) and “junior marketer” (code 3322) were used. 
7 
Furthermore, we added to the Type A and Type B applications the following characteristics: 1 
Belgian nationality, driver’s license, adequate IT skills, Dutch mother tongue, adequate English 2 
and French language skills and sports and cultural activities. In their motivation letters, the job 3 
candidates indicated they were highly interested, motivated and organised. Lastly, we appended 4 
a fictitious postal address (the combination of a real street in a middle-class neighbourhood and a 5 
non-existent street number) and a date of birth to all application templates. 6 
Randomised Disclosure of Applicants’ Gender 7 
To erase any dependence of gender differentials in call-backs on the application type, a typically 8 
male and a typically female sounding name were alternately assigned to the Type A and Type B 9 
applications. An appendix with the four combinations of resumes (Type A with female name; 10 
Type A with male name; Type B with female name; and Type B with male name) for one of the 11 
educational degrees (Bachelor in business administration with accountancy and tax as a 12 
specialisation) is available online (Online Appendix A).  13 
We sent the applications in an alternating order to the selected job postings, with a one-day 14 
delay in between. This resulted in a randomisation procedure in which we alternated between 15 
four pairs of applications: (i) first the Type A application with the female name and then (one 16 
day later) the Type B application with the male name; (ii) first the Type A application with the 17 
male name and then the Type B application with the female name; (iii) first the Type B 18 
application with the male name and then the Type A application with the female name; (iv) first 19 
the Type B application with the female name and then the Type A application with the male 20 
name. To the first vacancy combination (i) was sent, to the second vacancy combination (ii), to 21 
the third vacancy combination (iii), to the fourth vacancy combination (iv), to the fifth vacancy 22 
again combination (i) and so on. This randomisation procedure was carried through for each of 23 
the two educational degrees separately. 24 
We chose “Elke De Vos” and “Anke De Vriendt” as the names of the female candidate 25 
holding a Bachelor and the one holding a Master, respectively, and “Stijn Van Lancker” and 26 
“Stijn Van De Voorde” as the names of the male candidates. We made sure that the chosen 27 
8 
names did not represent a different social background following Bloothooft and Onland (2011) 1 
who linked the suffix of the name Dutch speaking parents choose for their children with these 2 
children’s later wages. 3 
We matched to each assigned name a mobile phone number and an email address. The 4 
voicemail messages were the telecommunication providers’ standard (Dutch) messages (“Hello, 5 
[Name of the fictitious candidate] cannot answer your call. Please leave a message after the 6 
tone”). The names of the fictitious candidates were recorded by young people with a similar 7 
social-economic background (i.e. native students in the Master in (business) economics at Ghent 8 
University). The email addresses were registered with large and commonly used providers. All 9 
fictitious job applications were sent to the selected real vacancies by email. In view of avoiding 10 
detection, we applied to no more than one job posting from the same employer. 11 
Measurement of Call-back 12 
Call-backs were received by telephone voicemail and by email. As we mentioned postal 13 
addresses with non-existent street numbers in the applications, we could not measure reactions 14 
from the employer side by regular mail. However, several Flemish human resource managers 15 
confirmed that, nowadays, employers rarely invite job candidates to selection interviews through 16 
the latter channel. To minimise inconvenience to the employers, we immediately declined 17 
positive call-back. By analogy with the corresponding testing literature, all reactions from the 18 
employer side received later than 30 days after sending out the applications were discounted. 19 
However, as we did not receive any positive reaction after 30 days, this turned out to be a 20 
redundant restriction. 21 
In our data-analysis, we distinguish between two definitions of positive call-back. Positive 22 
call-back in a strict sense is defined as getting an invitation for an interview concerning the job 23 
for which one applied – this definition was adopted by, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). 24 
Positive call-back in a broad sense includes, in addition to the former definition, the request to 25 
provide more information or to contact the employer or the receipt of an alternative job proposal 26 
– this definition was adopted by, e.g., Kaas and Manger (2012). 27 
9 
Variation in Occupational Level and Job Authority 1 
Sticky Floors may translate into lower probabilities for females to make promotion in four 2 
dimensions: occupational level, job authority, wages and non-statutory benefits (Deschacht et al., 3 
2011). As the two latter job aspects are not mentioned in the job postings in the database of the 4 
Public Employment Agency of Flanders, our experiment does not allow observing these aspects 5 
at the vacancy level. Therefore, we will focus on promotions in terms of occupational levels and 6 
the degree of job authority. However, at the end of the regression analysis below we will include 7 
the average wage in the occupation as a proxy for the wage in the posted job as a variable 8 
explaining call-back rates by gender. 9 
Each of the 576 vacancies to which we sent two fictitious job applications was matched with 10 
an indicator of the occupational level and with an indicator of the job authority level. This was 11 
done immediately after sending out the first application to a selected vacancy (and ipso facto 12 
before call-back was received). On the one hand, based on the information in the vacancy, all 13 
vacancies were matched with an occupation in the ISCO-08 classification system – ISCO-08 is 14 
the second-generation International Standard Classification of Occupations, based on a 15 
resolution of experts on labour statistics held in December 2007 and endorsed by the Governing 16 
Body of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in March 2008. More concretely, we 17 
searched a best match between the name of the vacancy (i.e. the name of the job) and the 18 
description of the tasks within the job in the vacancy on the one hand and four elements 19 
mentioned in the ISCO-08 group definitions file 20 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/docs/gdstruct08.xls) on the other hand: 21 
definition, tasks included, included occupation names and excluded occupation names. A new 22 
job at a higher ISCO-08 1-digit-level – to which we will refer in the remainder of this article as 23 
its “occupational level” – than the current one was defined as a promotion in terms of 24 
occupational level.
10
 25 
                                                     
10 The reader will notice that, due to our choice of the candidates current job and our procedure of matching these candidates with vacancies, both 
the current job and the job for which one applied were closely related to their academic degree and their specialisation. So, observed (potential) 
 
10 
On the other hand, the jobs for which our fictitious job candidates applied were classified in 1 
three categories concerning job authority following Hachen (1990): jobs with no supervision 2 
authority, i.e. no supervision or coordination tasks concerning the work of other workers (level 3 
1); jobs with supervision authority but no influence on the wage or promotion opportunities of 4 
other workers (level 2); and jobs with both supervision authority and influence on the wage or 5 
promotion opportunities of other workers (level 3). As the current job of the candidates was at 6 
level 1, a new job with at least supervision authority (i.e. at level 2 or level 3) was defined as a 7 
promotion.  8 
Limitations of the Experimental Design 9 
Before answering our research question by means of a statistical analysis of the gathered data, in 10 
this subsection, we discuss some limitations of our experimental research setting. 11 
First, our design can be effective only in demonstrating gender discrimination in the first 12 
stage of the recruitment process. Because we simply analyse the content of first call-backs, we 13 
cannot translate our empirical results into divergences in job offers. Bertrand and Mullainathan 14 
(2004) however argue that, even in the case the recruitment process has moderate friction, one 15 
could expect that reduced interview chances translate into reduced job offer chances. Second, 16 
our design is limited in its focus on promotion transitions to other firms. Unequal opportunities 17 
in promotion transitions within firms, which cannot be investigated by means of an experiment 18 
in the sense of the one outlined in this section, may be characterised by other dynamics. Third, 19 
we test for unequal treatment only within the vacancies targeted at individuals with a Bachelor’s 20 
or Master’s degree in business posted in the database of the Public Employment Agency of 21 
                                                                                                                                                                          
occupational transitions are in rule vertical movements (i.e. transitions in job level) and not horizontal movements (i.e. transitions in job content). 
This is a desirable situation as, therefore, promotions in occupational level following our definition may not reflect non-promotional horizontal 
transitions. The most common promotions in occupational level observed in our data are those from accountant (ISCO-08 1-digit-level 3) and file 
administrator assurances (level 4) to financial professional (level 2); from management assistant (level 3) and legal file administrator (level 3) to 
administration professional (level 2); from dispatcher (level 3) to manufacturing, mining, construction and distribution manager (level 1); and 
from junior marketer (level 3) to sales, marketing and public relations professional (level 2). 
11 
Flanders. It is possible that unequal treatment based on gender is more (or less) apparent among 1 
employers who rely on other channels (such as social networks) for filling their vacancies or 2 
among employers who have to fill vacancies targeted at other profiles. However, we are 3 
specifically interested in the relationship between hiring discrimination against women and the 4 
potential promotion implied by the jobs for which they apply. As this third limitation causes, by 5 
construction, a similar shift in the discrimination measures for the selected jobs implying a 6 
promotion and for those implying no promotion, our main research conclusions remain valid. 7 
Fourth, the occupational level and job authority promotion dimensions defined in the 8 
previous section may correlate with each other and with other vacancy characteristics. As a 9 
consequence, descriptive statistics on heterogeneity in discrimination by these promotion 10 
dimensions of the tested jobs might reflect heterogeneity of gender discrimination by other 11 
dimensions. Therefore, we merge the gathered data with administrative data at the occupation-, 12 
firm- and sector-level and analyse the merged data by means of a regression analysis controlling 13 
for potential confounders. 14 
Results 15 
Descriptive Data Analysis 16 
Table 1 and Table 2 describe the experimentally gathered data adopting the strict and broad 17 
definition of positive call-back respectively. We provide the reader with two frequently used 18 
statistical measures: the Positive Call-back Ratio (PCR) and the Net Discrimination Rate 19 
(NDR) (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Neumark et al., 1996; Riach and Rich, 2002). 20 
Overall, in 88 (195) of the 576 vacancies at least one candidate received a positive call -21 
back in strict sense (in broad sense). 32 (98) cases resulted in a positive call-back for both 22 
candidates, 31 (51) in a positive call-back for just the male candidate and 25 (46) in a positive 23 
call-back for the female candidate only. The overall PCR is obtained by dividing the total 24 
12 
percentage of applications for which male candidates received a positive call-back by the 1 
corresponding percentage for the female candidates. At the level of the total dataset, the 2 
positive call-back rate following the strict sense (broad sense) definition is 11%
11
 (26%) for 3 
male candidates and 10% (25%) for female candidates. The resulting PCR is 1.11 (1.03), 4 
indicating that the male candidates got on average 11% (3%) more positive call-back in 5 
reaction to their applications. These ratios are not significantly different from one and so we 6 
conclude that, overall, employers did not discriminate based on sex. 7 
  8 
[[Table 1 about here]]. 9 
[[Table 2 about here]]. 10 
 11 
To provide the reader with an initial answer to our research question, we split our sample 12 
by the two aforementioned dimensions of promotion. First, we find significant evidence for 13 
unequal treatment against females when they applied for jobs at a higher ISCO-08 level than 14 
the level of their current job. In this case, the call-back ratio is 1.50 (1.23) saying that males 15 
got about 50% more invitations for a job interview (23% more positive reactions in broad 16 
sense). Stated otherwise, when applying for these jobs, women got about 33% less interview 17 
invitations and 19% less positive reactions in broad sense. This finding is in line with our first 18 
research hypothesis of more hiring discrimination against women when they apply for jobs 19 
implying a promotion. Second, we find no significantly unequal treatment for both subsamples 20 
by the promotion dimension related to job authority. 21 
The overall NDR is calculated by subtracting the number of applications for which the 22 
female candidate was preferred from the number of applications for which the male candidate 23 
was preferred and dividing the result by the number of pairs in which at least one candidate 24 
received a positive call-back. The result is a net measure of the number of discriminatory acts 25 
                                                     
11 0.11 = (32+31)/576. 
13 
a female applicant could expect to encounter per application for which at least one candidate 1 
received a positive call-back. Overall, the NDR is 0.07 (0.03) adopting the strict sense (broad 2 
sense) definition of positive call-back. Based on a standard χ2 test, we cannot reject the 3 
hypothesis that the candidates of both sexes were treated unfavourably equally often. 4 
However, if the NDR is broken down by the occupational level and job authority promotion 5 
dimensions, we get results in line with those based on the PCR. 6 
An explanation for the finding of no significant heterogeneity in the job authority 7 
dimension could be that for supervising positions (i.e. rather middle-management than 8 
management) soft and social (leading) skills which are often related to women outweigh the 9 
aforementioned more “masculine” characteristics, mentioned in the introduction, in respect of 10 
employers. 11 
Regression analysis 12 
As, by construction, both the male and female candidate exhibit the same observable 13 
characteristics per vacancy, regressing positive call-back on the gender of the candidate (and 14 
vacancy and employee characteristics) leads to the same empirical conclusion as the one based 15 
on Panel A of Table 1 and Table 2. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the occupational 16 
level and job authority promotion dimensions may correlate with each other and with other 17 
vacancy characteristics and, therefore, the results presented in Panel B and Panel C of Table 1 18 
may in fact reflect heterogeneity of gender discrimination by other dimensions. Moreover, due to 19 
the finite size of our data, the promotion indicators of the posted jobs may even correlate with 20 
the application type (A or B) to which the female candidate was assigned and with whether her 21 
application was sent before or after the male application. Therefore, we further explore the 22 
experimentally gathered data by means of a regression analysis. Summary statistics of the 23 
variables used in this analysis are outlined in Table 3. 24 
 25 
[[Table 3 about here]]. 26 
14 
 1 
Table 4 and Table 5 present our regression results. We regress, by means of a linear 2 
probability model, the probability of positive call-back on various sets of key and control 3 
variables, included as such and in interaction with female sex of the candidate.
12
 For reasons of 4 
comparability of the regression results, all explanatory variables that are interacted with “Female 5 
candidate” are normalised by subtracting the mean among the subpopulation of female 6 
candidates and, for continuous variables, by dividing the result by the standard deviation among 7 
this subpopulation. The estimation results for all variables interacted with female sex of the 8 
candidate are presented in Table 4 (using positive call-back in strict sense as an outcome) and 9 
Table 5 (using positive call-back in broad sense as an outcome).
13
 For each of the presented 10 
models we computed multicollinearity diagnostics leading to variance inflation factors lower 11 
than five, except for some sector dummies. In what follows, we first focus on the results of Table 12 
4 and then compare these results with the ones in Table 5. 13 
 14 
[[Table 4 about here]]. 15 
[[Table 5 about here]]. 16 
 17 
In models (1), (2) and (3), we regress positive call-back on the dummy indicating a female 18 
gender of the candidate (model (1)); female sex of the candidate and a dummy indicating the 19 
posted job implied a promotion in occupational level, included as such and in interaction with 20 
female sex (model (2)); and female sex of the candidate and a dummy indicating the posted job 21 
implied a promotion in job authority, included as such and in interaction with female sex (model 22 
(3)). By construction, the estimations presented in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 4 reflect 23 
those presented in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C of Table 1. For instance, based on column (1), 24 
                                                     
12 We also performed estimations with vacancy fixed-effects and probit estimations. The results for these exercises are closely comparable to 
those presented in the main text and are available on request. 
13 We do not present the main effects for these variables for reasons of concision. 
15 
we learn that revealing a female gender lowers the chance on an invitation for a job interview 1 
with about one percentage point, which squares with the comparison of the positive call-back 2 
rates for males (11%) and females (10%) mentioned in the previous subsection. Furthermore, 3 
column (2) indicates that the gender gap in job interview invitation is about six percentage points 4 
higher (and relatively more to the detriment of females) in jobs implying a promotion in 5 
occupational level compared to jobs implying no promotion in this respect. 6 
Next, in model (4), we combine the explanatory variables included in model (2) and model 7 
(3). As a consequence, the finding of less positive call-back for women when they apply for jobs 8 
at a better ISCO level is even enforced. On the other hand, the coefficient for the interaction with 9 
the job authority promotion dimension increases and even turns positive, albeit insignificantly 10 
so. This is due to the positive correlation between the variables indicating a promotion in the 11 
occupational level and job authority dimensions (Pearson r = 0.56). Clearly, when not 12 
controlling for the former interaction, the latter interaction picks up part of the fact that hiring 13 
chances are lower for women in jobs implying a promotion in occupational level. 14 
In model (5), we extend the set of variables included as such and in interaction with female 15 
sex of the applicant. On the one hand, to control for the aforementioned potential correlation 16 
between these variables and the promotion indicators of the selected jobs, we include variables 17 
indicating applications that were the first one of the pair sent to the vacancy and that used the 18 
Type B template – as the templates differ by academic degree, we adopt a Type B dummy for 19 
each degree. 20 
On the other hand, we include a set of variables capturing employee and vacancy 21 
characteristics which may affect call-back rates and may be correlated, at least due to the finite 22 
size of our data, with the promotion indicators of the posted jobs (see Table 3). First, we include 23 
an indicator of the education level of the applicant (a dummy indicating a Master’s degree) as 24 
both theoretical and empirical studies show that discrimination decreases with the level of 25 
education (Baert et al., 2015; Bursell, 2007; Taubman and Wales, 1974; Wood et al., 2009). 26 
Second, we adopt variables indicating temporary and part-time contracts, as uniformly 27 
mentioned in the vacancies in the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders. If 28 
females have a relatively higher access to temporary and part-time jobs and these kinds of jobs 29 
16 
are less present in the tested vacancies implying a promotion in occupational level – Table 3 1 
shows that this is the case – this could drive the results presented in Panel B of Table 1. Third, 2 
and related to the recent theory of erotic capital as a personal asset besides economic, cultural 3 
and social capital and the empirical evidence on gender differentials in labour market 4 
discrimination (Baert, 2014; Hakim, 2010), we add a proxy for the gender of the key decision 5 
maker in the first stage of the recruitment procedure, i.e. the gender of the mentioned contact 6 
person in the vacancy. Fourth, we include, from model (5) on, the natural logarithm of the 7 
average number of workers in the firm in 2010 as a proxy of its size.
14
 We do this as some 8 
former contributions to the empirical literature on labour market discrimination against ethnic 9 
minorities report a negative relationship between firm size and hiring discrimination related to 10 
the fact that larger firms are more likely to have a dedicated human resources function and have 11 
therefore, on average, more standardised procedures for recruitment (Kaas and Manger, 2012; 12 
Wood et al., 2009). Fifth, we include the fraction of female workers in the job as one could 13 
expect that, as typically male (female) characteristics are (perceived as) particularly productive 14 
in traditionally male (female) occupations, unequal treatment should be more in favour of 15 
women in female-dominated occupations (Booth and Leigh, 2010; Weichselbaumer, 2004).
15
 16 
Sixth, to erase any correlation between the promotion indicators of the selected jobs and the 17 
(other) characteristics of the sectors in which they were selected, we include 2-digit sector 18 
dummies.
16
 In total, 57 sectors are represented in the data. As is the case for all other mentioned 19 
variables, these dummies are included both as such and in interaction with female sex of the 20 
candidate. 21 
Column (5) of Table 4 shows the estimation results for model (5). We observe a substantial 22 
but insignificant coefficient with the expected sign for the interaction between female sex of the 23 
                                                     
14 This proxy was obtained from the Bel-first database (Bureau Van Dijk) after looking up the company number of the firm in the databases of 
the Flemish business magazine Trends and the Belgian organisation of Self-Employed and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises UNIZO. 
15 This variable is proxied by the average proportion of females in each occupation, following the ISCO-08 classification, in the European Social 
Survey (sixth round). 
16 We use the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (“NACE”) at the 2-digit-level. The sector code was, 
based on the name and the address of the firm mentioned in the vacancy, found in the aforementioned databases of Trends and UNIZO. 
17 
candidate and the variable “Temporary contract”. More importantly, however, is that the 1 
estimate for the interaction between female sex of the candidate and the dummy indicating 2 
occupational level promotion jobs hardly changes by introducing the mentioned variables. We 3 
also run model (5) without sector dummies leading to very similar results, which are available on 4 
request. 5 
Last, in model (6) we extend the set of explanatory variables included in model (5) with the 6 
average wage in the job following the ISCO-08 classification at the 3-digit level in 2010.
17
 We 7 
get, however, no significant coefficient for this variable. This may point in the direction of no 8 
heterogeneity in gender discrimination by the wage of the offered job. Just as well, however, this 9 
finding might be explained by the fact that the average wage in the job following the ISCO-08 10 
classification is not a good proxy for the wage in the particular posted job. Moreover, even when 11 
employer discrimination is as such not heterogeneous by the wage level in the occupation, one 12 
could expect that our main finding of an unequal access for males and females to (better paid) 13 
positions at a higher functional level should translate into gender differences in pay.  14 
The results outlined in Table 5, using the broad sense definition of positive call-back as an 15 
outcome variable, lead to the same conclusion concerning the interactions between female sex of 16 
the candidate and the promotion indicators of the selected jobs. Thereby, we can conclude that 17 
the regression analysis presented in the current subsection confirms the descriptive findings of 18 
the former subsection. 19 
Conclusion 20 
In this study, we contributed to the literature by investigating the importance of employer 21 
preferences in explaining Sticky Floors, i.e. the pattern that women are, compared to men, less 22 
                                                     
17 Source: Directorate-general Statistics and Economic information of Belgium. We use the 2010 statistics since those of later years are not yet 
available. 
18 
likely to start to climb the job ladder. It was novel in its approach to gather original experimental 1 
data on gender differences in promotion opportunities. More concretely, we conducted a field 2 
experiment in which pairs of fictitious job applications of male and female Bachelors in business 3 
administration and Masters in business economics with about 5 years of work experience in their 4 
first and current job were sent to real job postings in Belgium. As we sent applications to both 5 
vacancies implying a promotion in terms of occupational level and/or job authority and to 6 
vacancies at the same level, we were able to test whether unequal treatment of young men and 7 
women in the labour market was heterogeneous by whether or not jobs imply a promotion in 8 
comparison with employees’ current position. We found significant evidence for hiring 9 
discrimination against females when they applied for jobs at a higher occupational level. For 10 
these jobs, females got, compared to males, about 33% less invitations for a job interview and 11 
19% less positive reactions in broad sense. On the other hand, we found no significant 12 
heterogeneity in hiring discrimination by the job authority level of the posted job. In addition, 13 
based on regression analysis, we also found no evidence for heterogeneity in equal treatment 14 
of males and females by the average wage in the occupation mentioned in the vacancy. 15 
From a policy perspective, we cannot deny that our results point in the direction of 16 
discrimination of young women, albeit only when they apply for jobs implying a promotion in 17 
occupational level. In Belgium, as in many other OECD countries, the legal framework to punish 18 
labour market discrimination is available,
18
 so that the main benefit seems to lie in a more 19 
vigorous detection of unequal hiring chances for promotion jobs. One could investigate whether 20 
this could not happen based on a systematic application of the method we have used in this 21 
study. An alternative policy option, which can be introduced voluntarily by individual firms or 22 
imposed by the government, is anonymising job applications. Åslund and Skans (2012) showed, 23 
by means of a quasi-experiment in Gothenburg, that removing names from job applications may 24 
indeed increase first call-back and job offers for female job candidates. However, Krause et al. 25 
(2012) and Behaghel et al. (Forthcoming) argue that policy makers should be aware of 26 
                                                     
18 See Bassanini and Saint-Martin (2008) for a detailed description of the legal and institutional anti-discrimination framework in 23 OECD 
countries.  
19 
unintended effects of anonymised job applications (for instance with respect to affirmative 1 
action)
19
 and that – therefore – the method of implementation is crucial. 2 
As employees at a higher occupational level imply higher investment and (temporary) exit 3 
costs, our results may be related to the career penalty of motherhood (Budig and England, 2001; 4 
Correll et al., 2007; Kmec, 2011; ). In this respect, broadening the concept of discrimination, to 5 
include dimensions about how jobs are structured and rewarded that have a disparate impact on 6 
mothers, could be fruitful. In addition, tax incentives could be provided to employers for 7 
reintegrating women who return to their job after maternity leave. 8 
Given our experimental design, our results can, by construction, not be explained by theories 9 
of (“old-boys”-)networking and sector segregation (Forret and Dougherty, 2004; Groot and 10 
Maassen van den Brink, 1996; Ludsteck, 2014). Although we cannot rule out the possibility that 11 
these mechanisms contribute to Sticky Floors as well, our results suggest that awareness 12 
campaigns targeted at these mechanisms will not be sufficient in fighting gender inequalities in 13 
promotion opportunities.  14 
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Table 1. The Probability of Positive Call-back in Strict Sense: Descriptive Analysis 
Data selection Jobs 
Neither candidate 
positive call-back 
Both candidates 
positive call-back 
Only male     
positive call-back 
Only female 
positive call-back 
PCR t NDR χ2 
 (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)     
A. All jobs 
All jobs 576 488 32 31 25 1.105 0.802 0.068 0.643 
B. Breakdown by occupational level promotion dimension 
Jobs at same level as current job 248 206 18 9 15 0.818 1.226 -0.143 1.500 
Jobs at higher level than current job 328 282 14 22 10 1.500** 2.133 0.261** 4.500 
C. Breakdown by job authority promotion dimension 
Jobs with no job authority 328 271 21 20 16 1.108 0.666 0.070 0.444 
Jobs with job authority 248 217 11 11 9 1.100 0.447 0.065 0.200 
Notes. See subsection “Variation in Occupational Level and Job Authority” for a definition of the used promotion dimensions. The Positive Call-back Ratio (PCR) is calculated by dividing the 
percentage of applications for which male candidates received a positive call-back by the corresponding percentage for the female candidates. The t-test for the PCR tests the null hypothesis that 
the probability of positive call-back is the same for candidates from both gender groups. As two applicants contacted the same firm, the probability of the male applicant receiving an invitation 
correlates with the probability of the female applicant candidate receiving one. Therefore, standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. The Net 
Discrimination Rate (NDR) is calculated by subtracting the number of applications for which the female candidate was preferred from the number of applications for which the male candidate 
was preferred and dividing by the number of pairs in which at least one candidate received a positive call-back. The chi-square test for the NDR tests the null hypothesis that both candidates are 
treated unfavourably just as frequently. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. 
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Table 2. The Probability of Positive Call-back in Broad Sense: Descriptive Analysis 
Data selection Jobs 
Neither candidate 
positive call-back 
Both candidates 
positive call-back 
Only male      
positive call-back 
Only female 
positive call-back 
PCR t NDR χ2 
 (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)     
A. All jobs 
All jobs 576 381 98 51 46 1.035 0.507 0.026 0.258 
B. Breakdown by occupational level promotion dimension 
Jobs at same level as current job 248 156 45 18 29 0.851 1.610 -0.120 2.574 
Jobs at higher level than current job 328 225 53 33 17 1.229** 2.277 0.155** 5.120 
C. Breakdown by job authority promotion dimension 
Jobs with no job authority 328 209 60 28 31 0.967 0.390 -0.025 0.153 
Jobs with job authority 248 172 38 23 15 1.151 1.300 0.105 1.684 
Notes. See subsection “Variation in Occupational Level and Job Authority” for a definition of the used promotion dimensions. The Positive Call-back Ratio (PCR) is calculated by dividing the 
percentage of applications for which male candidates received a positive call-back by the corresponding percentage for the female candidates. The t-test for the PCR tests the null hypothesis that 
the probability of positive call-back is the same for candidates from both gender groups. As two applicants contacted the same firm, the probability of the male applicant receiving a positive 
reaction correlates with the probability of the female applicant candidate receiving one. Therefore, standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. The Net 
Discrimination Rate (NDR) is calculated by subtracting the number of applications for which the female candidate was preferred from the number of applications for which the male candidate 
was preferred and dividing by the number of pairs in which at least one candidate received a positive call-back. The chi-square test for the NDR tests the null hypothesis that both candidates are 
treated unfavourably just as frequently. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. 
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Table 3. Regression Variables (Employee and Vacancy Characteristics): Summary Statistics 
 All jobs Jobs implying a promotion in occupational level Jobs implying a promotion in job authority  
First application sent within pair of female sex 0.500 (0.500) 0.506 (0.501) 0.520 (0.501) 
Application Type B of female sex 0.500 (0.500) 0.530 (0.500) 0.544 (0.499) 
Master’s degree 0.500 (0.500) 0.616 (0.487) 0.540 (0.499) 
Temporary contract 0.127 (0.333) 0.116 (0.321) 0.109 (0.312) 
Part-time contract 0.075 (0.263) 0.061 (0.240) 0.052 (0.223) 
Male recruiter 0.325 (0.469) 0.305 (0.461) 0.270 (0.445) 
Log(average FTE in firm) 1.472 (1.048) 1.501 (1.085) 1.510 (1.003) 
% female workers in occupation 0.550 (0.181) 0.497 (0.163) 0.490 (0.158) 
Average wage in occupation in EUR 4,098 (1,043) 4,787 (855.6) 4,813 (1,066) 
Sector number (NACE, 2-digit-level) 65.54 (17.51) 66.86 (17.29) 66.32 (17.31) 
See subsection “Regression Analysis” for a definition of the listed variables. The reported statistics are averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 4. The Probability of Positive Call-back in Strict Sense: Regression Analysis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female candidate -0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) 
Female candidate * Promotion in occupational level (norm.)  -0.061** (0.026)  -0.092*** (0.035) -0.095** (0.040) -0.106** (0.049) 
Female candidate * Promotion in job authority (norm.)   0.004 (0.026) 0.055 (0.034) 0.067 (0.041) 0.063 (0.044) 
Female candidate * First application sent within pair (norm.)     0.065 (0.048) 0.068 (0.048) 
Female candidate * Application Type B, Master (norm.)     0.061 (0.063) 0.061 (0.063) 
Female candidate * Application Type B, Bachelor (norm.)     0.046 (0.072) 0.044 (0.071) 
Female candidate * Master’s degree (norm.)     -0.030 (0.053) -0.032 (0.053) 
Female candidate * Temporary contract (norm.)     0.071 (0.059) 0.071 (0.059) 
Female candidate * Part-time contract (norm.)     0.019 (0.053) 0.019 (0.053) 
Female candidate * Male recruiter (norm.)     -0.003 (0.035) -0.002 (0.036) 
Female candidate * Log(average FTE in firm) (norm.)     0.017 (0.017) 0.017 (0.017) 
Female candidate * % female workers in occupation (norm.)     -0.003 (0.017) -0.002 (0.017) 
Female candidate * Average wage in occupation (norm.)      0.009 (0.024) 
Linear probability model Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: invitation to a job interview Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects interacted with female candidate No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1074 1074 
Notes. See subsections “Variation in Occupational Level and Job Authority” and “Regression Analysis” for a definition of the variables adopted in the regressions. The variables that are 
interacted with “Female candidate” are also included without interaction with this variable. Except for “Female candidate”, all variables are normalised (norm.) by subtracting the mean among 
the population of female candidates. Continuous variables are further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among this subpopulation. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the 
vacancy level, are in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. From model (5) on, 78 observations are dropped due to missing values for the added control 
variables. 
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Table 5. The Probability of Positive Call-back in Broad Sense: Regression Analysis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female candidate -0.009 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) -0.010 (0.018) -0.010 (0.018) 
Female candidate * Promotion in occupational level (norm.)  -0.093*** (0.035)  -0.102** (0.043) -0.085* (0.051) -0.109* (0.062) 
Female candidate * Promotion in job authority (norm.)   -0.041 (0.034) 0.015 (0.042) 0.034 (0.049) 0.025 (0.052) 
Female candidate * First application sent within pair (norm.)     0.160** (0.069) 0.163** (0.070) 
Female candidate * Application Type B, Master (norm.)     0.092 (0.097) 0.093 (0.097) 
Female candidate * Application Type B, Bachelor (norm.)     0.053 (0.102) 0.051 (0.102) 
Female candidate * Master’s degree (norm.)     -0.042 (0.080) -0.046 (0.080) 
Female candidate * Temporary contract (norm.)     0.059 (0.089) 0.059 (0.090) 
Female candidate * Part-time contract (norm.)     -0.005 (0.074) -0.006 (0.074) 
Female candidate * Male recruiter (norm.)     -0.067 (0.046) -0.066 (0.046) 
Female candidate * Log(average FTE in firm) (norm.)     -0.003 (0.022) -0.002 (0.022) 
Female candidate * % female workers in occupation (norm.)     0.028 (0.020) 0.032 (0.021) 
Female candidate * Average wage in occupation (norm.)      0.021 (0.031) 
Linear probability model Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: any positive reaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects interacted with female candidate No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1074 1074 
Notes. See subsections “Variation in Occupational Level and Job Authority” and “Regression Analysis” for a definition of the variables adopted in the regressions. The variables that are 
interacted with “Female candidate” are also included without interaction with this variable. Except for “Female candidate”, all variables are normalised (norm.) by subtracting the mean among 
the population of female candidates. Continuous variables are further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among this subpopulation. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the 
vacancy level, are in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. From model (5) on, 78 observations are dropped due to missing values for the added control 
variables. 
 
